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THE EARLY ESTABLISHMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF BANKING IN JAPAN: 
PHASES AND POLICIES 1872 - 1913 
Jura Teranishi and Hugh Patrick* 
I. Introduction 
One of the important institutional components of the process of 
economic development for market-oriented economies is the successful 
establishment of a modern financial system. This is, of course, a 
complex matter, involving many factors and issues. In this paper we 
focus on two important themes: the timing (phasing) of the early 
establishment and development of the Japanese collllilercial banking system, 
and the role of government policy in this process. The early establish­
ment of banking relative to modern industry is one of the well-stylized 
propositions about Japanese economic development. However, the litera­
ture is not precise regarding the timing of the process whereby financial 
development became important. In the following section we present 
measures to define the phases of the early development of Japan's modern 
banking sector. Our main hypothesis is that banks as financial inter­
mediaries became quantitatively significant around 1895, and only after 
*We have benefitted from the research assistance of Kazumi Asako 
and the comments of Shinichi Ichimura, Brock Short, and Yasukichi Yasuba 
on an earlier draft presented to the Conference on Japan's Historical 
Development Experiences and Contemporary Developing Countries (Tokyo: 
International Development Center of Japan, February 1978); our research 
has received financial support from the Japan Economic Planning Agency, 
Ford Foundation, and Yale University Sumitomo Fund. 
-2-
about 1905 did the allocation of funds by the banking sector come to exert 
substantial influence on the entire economy. 
This paper focuses on the growth and composition of bank liabilities-­
. private deposits, equity, and credit from the government and the central 
bank--as ~ajor measures of financial development. The concern is with 
the mobilization of savings: from the viewpoint of individual financial 
i i . be fore f undscan 1ent t h be raise.d l Previousnst tutions be ey must · 
studies have typically relied on bank equity capital as an indicator of 
development. This is a poor measure since bank equity does not indicate 
the role of banks as financial intermediaries or of indirect securities 
as monetary instruments. In brief, the essence of banking is deposits. 
To understand this point, consider the situation where bank liabilities 
are mainly composed of borrowing from government and equity capital. Bank 
equity is a primary security; it could be invested directly into capital 
accumulation. There is no real role of banking as a financial inter­
mediary in this case. This same analysis applies to bank credit from 
the government. As will be seen below, this was more or less the state 
of early banking in Japan. Therefore, a more detailed examination is 
needed to understand the meaning of the establishment of banking. 
While the importance of the government in the early development of the 
Japanese banking system has been well recognized, previous literature 
tends either toward general statements or toward detailed specific 
bank history cases' studies without a quantitative synthesis. The 
1The typical approach--analysis of efficient allocation of loanable 
funds by evaluation of bank asset portfolios--while certainly important 
is perhaps overdone. Unfortunately, data are not available for.this 
period to analyze the efficiency of bank lending. Porter (1966) adopts 
an approach similar to ours. 
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government's policies regarding entry and competition, the determination 
of interest rates, and inflation were particularly significant. Of 
special importance was the government provision of loanable funds to 
commercial banks. Indeed, our hypothesis is that the main thrust of 
early government policy toward the banking sector can be summarized 
the allocation of government credit to banks under a freely competi­as 
tive interest rate system. Initially, the government supplied large 
sums of credit to banks, encouraging the inauguration of banking 
business; then it gradually decreased its credit (in relative amounts), 
inducing the substitution of private deposits for its credit. It will 
be shown in Section III that this policy was quite effective in promo­
ting deposit banking. 
II. Phases of Banking Development 
A. Institutional Change 
We confine ourselves to the period between 1872 when the first 
modern commercial bank was established until the eve of World War I, 
when the banking system had become well established. 
1 This was an 
era (beginning in Meiji 1--1868) of major institutional change in Japan's 
economy, politics and society. A modern financial system was created 
in an evolutionary process that saw considerable changes in the nature 
of the banking system as well as the creation of various types of financial 
institutions. Moreover, the traditional financial system became 
1The subsequent period, between World War I and World War II, was 
a turbulent one of mergers and bankruptcies amount small banks and the 
rise of large, ~aibatsu banks; see Teranishi (1977b). This later petiod 
of financial development will be treated in a separate paper. 
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increasingly integrated with the new modern system, and the latter 
came increasingly to prevail (at least in the modern industrial sec­
tor.) 
Well prior to the establishment of commercial banks and other 
modern financial institutions, Japan already had a quite developed, 
even sophisticated, traditional financial system. At the end of 
Tokugawa (1850s-1860s) the economy was quite monetized, the use of 
currency widespread. There were urban bill brokers, large (rice) 
merchant houses specializing in loans to daimyo, and other manifes­
tations of a nascent modern financial system. Moneylenders and money­
lending was widespread, in rural as well as urban areas. Nonetheless 
financial markets, especially in smaller towns and rural areas, were 
local and segmented; there probably were wide regional disparities in 
interest rates on borrowing and in rates of return on real investment. 
Most private investment had to have been funded by self-financing or, 
at most, borrowing from friends and relatives. The practice of making 
deposits with others--by whatever name--was not widespread or large 
in amount. 
a newSuperimposed upon this traditional financial system was 
set of modern financial institutions, eventually more efficient in 
financial intermediation, more competitive, more innovative, more 
willing to extend the maturity of loans and dep~sita. Since this 
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1
process is described elsewhere, we provide only the barest summary. 
The first successful commercial banks, termed national banks, were 
founded in 1872. They were private banks with the privilege of bank 
note issue. Although rather inactive at first, the national banks 
increased in number very rapidly after the 1876 revision of the !fational 
Bank Act, which reduced reserve requirements (as cash in vault), from 
2
2/3 to 1/4 of bank note issue. By 1879, the number of national banks 
reached its predetermined maximum of 153. Thereafter, the establish­
ment of other forms of commercial banks--private banks, saving banks, 
and quasi banks--accelerated under the general commercial code. 
3 
In 1882, the Bank of Japan was established with one major purpose 
to obtain central bank monopoly control over the issuance of currency. 
At the same time, the National Bank Act was revised once 
1see for instance, Asakura (1961), Kato (1957), and Patrick (1967). 
Basic data are provided in Statistical Tables i, II, and III. We define 
the banking system as "all banks," which includes commercial banks 
and special banks. Note that savings banks and special banks had demand 
as well as time deposits. The precise coverage of banks is explained in 
the notes to Statistical Tables I and II. 
2The instrument of reserves was also changed from specie to government 
currency. 
3The first private bank was Mitsui Bank established in 1876. Quasi­
banking companies engaged in the multiple functions of trade, and even 
production, as well as finance. 
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again, stipulating the expiration of national bank charters twenty years 
after establishment, ending their privilege of bank note issue, and 
providing for the orderly, gradual redemption of national bank notes. 
In 1893 the Ordinary Bank Act and the Saving Bank Act were enacted and 
existing commercial banks (national banks, private banks, saving banks 
1
and quasi banks) were converted into either ordinary or saving banks. 
Although the Yokohama Specie Bank (for the financing of foreign 
trade) was established as early as 1880, most of the special banks for 
provision of long-term credit were founded around 1900. The postal 
saving system began in 1875 and the first insurance company was founded 
in 1879. The postal savings system was of substantial importance qual­
itatively in the 1880s in educatiug the populace about savings deposits 
and even quantitatively relative to the small amounts of private de­
posits in the banking system. The gold standard system was established 
in 1897 on the basis of reparation payments from the Sino-Japanese war. 
B. Indexes of Banking Development 
It is difficult to judge the timing of the establishment of the 
banking system simply by means of historical cases of individual banks 
because their establishment is so dispersed over time. It is preferable 
to examine broader quantitative evidence for the banking sector as a 
1As can be seen from Statistical Table II, the number of banks 
decreased by one-third in 1893 and equity capital declined by one­
tenth. This was mainly due to the disolution of some of the quasi 
banks at that time. 
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whole. Available data can be classified into the following categories: 
(1) the financing of banking; (2) the relative size of bank funds to other 
aggregates; (3) differentials of various interest rates; and (4) the 
relative size of modern financing to traditional finance. 
First, a brief discussion of the general price level environment 
is warranted. The effect of the rate of inflation, and hence infla­
tionary expectations, is one important determinant of the growth of 
the demand for deposits and of the financial system in general, especi­
ally where government policy sets nominal ceiling interest rates 
below market equilibria. Interest rates in Meiji Japan were determined 
in the marketplace, so this was not such a problem. While little is 
known about inflationary expectations in Meiji Japan, it is reasonable 
to infer that they were low. The rates of price change were erratic and 
in some years negative, with considerable dispersion by commodities and 
by region. As the data (see Statistical Tables II and III) for annual 
changes in the aggregate price expenditure index indicate, overall the 
period from the end of the Matsukata deflation in 1886 until World 
War I was one of modest price rise, at a 2.8% average annual rate, sub­
stantially below average interest rates on time deposits and loans. 
While the relationships among the (erratic) pattern of relatively low 
rates of inflation, financial development, and real economic performance 
require further analysis, we conjecture that inflation did not inhibit 
financial development over this period. 
(1) Financing of banking. Figure 1 shows certain noteworthy 
Figure 1 
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Notes: Percent composition relative to the total of the three items. 
Before 1887,national banks and after 1888 all banks. 
Sources: Statistical Tables I and II. 
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features of early bank financing. (i) In the early period (around 
1880), the share of private deposits in total bank liabilities was 
only 10-20%; most bank funds were obtained in the form either of gov-
1ernment credits or equity capital. (ii) After 1880, the share of 
private deposits increases rapidly and, concomitantly, the share of 
government credit decreases from the 40% level to less than 10%. The 
share of equity capital decreased moderately from 45% to 25%, (iii) 
After 1905 the percentage composition of these three sources of funds 
became relatively constant. 
The initial low share of deposits and high share of equity means 
that in the early stages intermediation by banks was quite limited (as 
already noted, bank equity is itself a primary security and could have 
been invested directly into real capital accumulation). Even by 1890 
the share of equity remained at the 45% level .. 
(2) Relative size of bank funds to other aggregates. Figure 2 
shows the ratios of bank funds (outstanding balances) to various aggre-
gates. 
2 
(iv) The ratio of total bank funds to the real capital stock 
shows a steady increase until around 1905, and thereafter levels 
1niscussed in more detail in Section III. Government credit 
is composed of government deposits, national bank notes and central
aank loans to banks. 
2The data reflected in Figure 2 are in stock terms of outstanding 
balances; bank funds refer to total liabilities including bank net worth. 
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off. (v) A similar phenomenon is seen with respect to the ratio of 
private deposits to total primary securities. Both these indexes can 
be considered fairly precise measures of the degree of financial inter­
mediation in stock terms. Incidentally~ it should be noted that a por­
tion of bank funds prior to 1892 is estimated, probably with an upward 
1
bias. Therefore, we can safely say that the degree of intermediation 
by banks steadily increased until around 1905. 
Similar ratios in flow terms of financial and real (investment) 
variables shown in Figure 3 demonstrate the following. (vi) The ratio 
between the change in private deposits and real investment rises substan­
tially around 1895, as does the total bank funds/investment ratio. Of 
course, this is a direct counterpart of proposition (iv) since a change 
in the stock ratio is preceded by a change in the flow ratio. Neverthe­
less, the contrast before and after 1895 in Figure 3 is in itself im­
pressive. The degree of financial intermediation in flow terms became 
substantial from 1895, though with certain erratic short-term move­
ments. 
(3) Differentials Among Interest Rates. When financial markets are 
segmented, the efficient allocation of funds is retarded even if the de-
gree of financial intermediation is quantitatively high. We can think 
of two kinds of market segmentation in developing countries: geographic, 
by region and location; and between traditional and modern financing of 
1 
For example, the private deposits of quasi banks are estimated by
assuming the same deposit-equity ratios for private and quasi banks. See 
Statistical Tables I and II. 
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Relative Importance of Bank Funds (Ratios of Outstanding Balances) 
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Figuee 3 
Relative Importance of Bank Funds 
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the same kinds of economic activity. Differentials among interest 
rates for the same types of financial claims in different markets pro­
vide a good measure of the degree of market segmentation. 
Figure 4 represents time series data for interest rates on bank 
deposits and loans and on loans of a major moneylender (Sakurai of 
Miyagi Prefecture in Tohoku), and on relevant differentials among 
rates. Two results can be obtained. (vii) The difference between 
the average loan interest rate and average deposit interest rate de­
creases steadily until 1910 and thereafter levels off. This narrow-
ing reflects both an increasing managerial efficiency by banks and 
heightened competitiveness within the banking industry. (viii) While 
there is no correlation between the bank loan interest rate and the money­
lending rate in the early years, a positive relationship emerges from 
arolllld 1900. The simple correlation coefficient between the money-
lender Sakurai's lending rate and the average bank lending rate in 
Miyagi Prefecture (where Sakurai was located) is 0.068 for the period 
1892-1900, 0.724 for 1901-1918, -0.084 for 1892-1904 and 0.560 for 
11905-1918. This suggests that traditional financing represented by 
moneylending, initially autonomous, had to compete increasingly with 
modern bank finance, so that its lending rate was much influenced by 
the bank loan rate from 1900-1905 on. Since, as is discussed below, 
1This point was originaliy made by Shibuya in his extensive studies 
on moneylending (1959), (1962a) and (1962b). We are grateful to him for 
providing us unpublished data on the moneylender interest rate. 
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traditional finance continued to retain a significant place throughout the 
prewar period, it is important to know the traditional financial system 
was becoming integrated with the modern financial system from about 1900-
1905. 
Figure 5 provides another set of information concerning the degree 
of market segmentation. In it are graphed the estimates of the coef­
ficient of variation for prefectural data on deposit and loan interest 
rates and price of silk. (ix) It can be seen that the re-
gional differentials for the deposit interest rate decreased quite 
rapidly in the 1890s. This suggests
1 the deposit market, which had 
been regionally segmented initially even within the modern banking system, 
reflected the integration of the banking system into much more of a 
national market by around 1900. However, there was no definite conver­
gence in the coefficient of variation for the interest rate on loans, 
while the coefficients of variation of connnodity prices had moderate 
downward trends. The lack of lending rate convergence suggests a con­
tinuing regional difference in industrial structure and demand for funds, 
while the narrowing of variation in commodity prices suggests a general 
1yamamura (1970) is a detailed study on this convergence of regional 
interest·rate differentials. It can be argued that the ready availability 
of postal savings deposits at a common national interest rate became the 
standard against which local banks in various regions had to compete, 
thereby helping to create in effect a national market for deposits. 
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Figure 5 
Coefficients of Variation (CV) for Prefectural Interest Rates and Pricea 
CV of 
deposit interest rate (minimum) 
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movement toward integration of segmented markets in the real economy, 
induced probably by the development of information and transportation 
systems. 
(4) Relative size of modern to traditional finance. Virtually 
every economy has some methods of traditional financing prior to the 
introduction of modern banking. Therefore, the development of modern 
banking, and a modern financial system generally, in a sense involves 
a process of substitution of traditional financial methods by banking 
and other modern financial instruments. The financial markets of Meiji 
Japan were characterized by the prevalence of traditional financial 
methods. For example, Asakura (1961) estimated that loans by pawnbrokers 
amount to 70% of the total lendings to the private sector of national 
banks (circa 1884). We have also pointed out the continuing heavy re­
liance of small and medium-sized manufacturing firms as late as 1932 
on borrowings from acquaintances and relatives (Teranishi and Patrick 
{191.6}) as well as other traditional types of finance. 
Although available data are piecemeal, fairly good estimates on the 
debt composition of the agricultural sector are available {Teranishi, 
1977a}. At the end of 1888, the agricultural sector obtained only 7.2% 
of borrowings from modern financing (banks and credit cooperatives), while 
the overwhelming share (92.8%) came from traditional financial institu­
tions (moneylenders, merchants and pawnbrokers) as well as relatives 
and acquaintances (including rotating credit associations). In 1911, 
the percentage of borrowing from modern financial sources was 35.7%, 
that from traditional financial institutions 21.5%, and that from rela­
tives and acquaintances 42.9%. The same categories in 1932 comprised 
47.3%, 8.6% and 44.1% respectively. 
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The data indicate that the penetration of modern financing in agriculture 
took place during the period 1888-1911. Making a reasonable assumption that 
the percentage of borrowing from relatives and acquaintances also was about 
40% in 1888, it can be said that a rapid substitution of traditional finance 
by modern financing methods occurred during 1888-1911 in the agricultural 
sector. However, it is important to remember that the share of modern fi­
nancing still remained below 50% even in 1932 in the agricultural sector (as 
well as, presumably, in the small-scale indigenous parts of the secondary and 
tertiary sectors). 
The process of transformation from traditional to modern financial insti­
tutions, while complex in detail, seems to follow certain general patterns. 
Some types of institutions evolve from traditional forms. Most commercial 
banks were probably grafted onto the traditional system; some (especially 
quasi-banks and smaller ordinary banks) evolved from the moneylending activities 
of moneylending specialists, and merchants and pawnbrokers who also lent money 
and provided credit. While a number of "official" histories of individual 
banks are available thus far only a few analytical case studies have been 
1prepared. 
C. Phases of Banking Development 
The various data presented above make it possible to suggest the follow­
ing phasing of the early development of the modern banking sector. 
1chihokinyushi Kenkyukai [1974] provides interesting studies of the 
Kazama Bank by Shibuya, the Kujine Bank by Takashima, and the Yamaguchi 
Bank by Takahashi. 
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Phase 1 (1873-1894) 
Alti10ugh modern banking was established institutionally, its fi­
nancing relied heavily on equity capital and government credit. There­
fore, banks were not very different from moneylending companies, and 
their role in financial intermediation was small. 
Phase 2 (1895-1904) 
Increases in private deposits became sufficiently substantial as 
to affect the volume of private real investment; banks had thus become 
financial intermediaries in the sense of converting primary securities 
(lending and investments by banks) into indirect securities (private 
deposits). However, financial markets were still regionally segmented 
and traditional financing remained quite independent, so that the compe­
titive efficiency of allocation of funds was still far from fully at­
tained. Moreover, in terms of outstanding balances bank financing re­
mained quite dependent on equity and government credit. 
Phase 3 (1905-1913) 
Deposit banking became well developed. The deposit market became 
nationally integrated, and to a considerable extent traditional with 
modern finance, with modern financial sector rates shaping those in 
traditional moneylending, so that the conditions for attaining com­
petitive efficiency in fund allocation are also established. Moreover, 
the institutional diversification of the banking system by creation of 
various special banks has been completed. The number of ordinary banks 
has begun to decline as the smallest and weakest banks are weeded out. 
-28-
How significant is this phasing? Several points can be made. First, 
the effective establishment of banking in Japan should be considered to 
have occurred during 1895-1905. This is relatively early in the sense 
of being concurrent with the beginning of so-called modern economic growth, 
but is not so early as has usually been suggested. The standard assertion 
of early development has been somewhat methodologically deficient in simply 
focussing on the amount of bank equity capital, without consideration of 
other sources of funds, in particular the rise of deposit banking.
1 
Second, our phasing of bank development corresponds quite closely to 
the phasing of economic growth by Ohkawa and Rosovsky (1973): 1868-1885, 
the years of "transition"; 1885-1905, the years of "initial" modern economic 
growth; and 1905 and subsequent, the years of modern economic growth. More­
over, a recent paper by Ohkawa and Ranis (1978) argues that technology 
change was mainly responsible for per capita income growth in the pre-1905 
subphase, while the role of saving became relatively more important in 
the 1905-1917 subphase. One highly plausible conjecture is that the 
increasing role of saving is closely related to the establishment of the 
financial system. This certainly deserves further investigation. 
1Important exceptions are Kato (1957) and Fujino (1965). Kato emphasizes
the rise of deposit banking as one of the key characteristics of early bank 
development, together with his generalized notion of organ (kikan) banks. 
Fujino explicitly analysed the lead-lag relationship between deposits and 
bank equity, arguing that in the early stages changes in bank equity pre­
ceded changes in the ratio of deposit withdrawal to bank equity. 
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Third, a remaining important problem is how private investment was 
financed in the early years, especially before 1885 or so. Our tentative 
hypothesis is that investment was mainly financed by the allocation of 
accmnulated funds from traditional to new activities by rich merchants, 
landlords, and moneylenders operating through traditional financial chan­
nels. 
Fourth, it appears that Japanese financial development occurred 
relatively early in its modern economic development process, though 
1further explicitly comparative research is required. Certainly the 
national integration of regional financial markets took place relatively 
early. It has been suggested that the time lag between the onset of 
economic growth and the movement toward financial integration was between 
50-75 years in nineteenth century United States, and two to three 
decades in nineteenth century Austria. 2 For Japan the ratio of bank assets 
to GNP, a common if somewhat crude indicator of financial development, rose 
from 23.0% in 1892, to 31.9% in 1897, and 49.9% in 1905, levelling off there­
after to a ratio between 50-60% until 1913. In comparison, for the 49 develop­
ing countries for which data are available in the International Monetary 
Fund, International Financial Statistics, in 1971 only four countries had 
ratios above 40%; another six were in the 30-40% range, 16 between 20-30%, 
and 19 between 10-20%, while four had ratios less than 10%. 
1For comparisons with Europe and the United States see Cameron 
[1967] and [1972], and Goldsmith [1969]. 
2 see Good [1977], which includes an analysis of the Austrian case 
as well as citations to the literature on quantitative analysis of declines 
in interregional differences in interest rates. The classic study, for 
the United States, ·is Davis [1965]. 
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III. Government Policies for Development of the Banking System 
A. Banking Policies 
Government policies toward banking and the banking system throughout 
this period were carried out by a process of trial and error. One early 
example was the shift in policy from the pursuit of an American-type 
national bank system to a British-type central banking system with the 
creation of the Bank of Japan. Another example is the way in which 
special banks were created to meet financial needs not well met by 
commercial banks. Accordingly, analysis of the policy issues is quite 
complicated, and it is not easy to say whether there was a central 
motif in the policy goals or the process. However, from the per­
spective of hindsight, two major themes seem to have characterized 
the entire process. One is the consistent pursuit of a freely market-
determined interest rate policy concomitant with the creation of a highly 
competitive banking system, and another is the effective manipulation of 
government credit to the private banking sector. 
The Japanese interest rate system was essentially free, 
with rates determined in the market by the forces of demand and supply. 
There was virtually no official regulation of or control over interest 
rates. The sole regulation was the usury law established in 1877 which 
1
stipulated maximum loan rates. However this law was not effective 
because there were no penalties for violation, and noneylenders and most 
banks felt no restraint in setting interest rates higher than the maximum. 2 
1Risoku Seigen Ho (Interest Rates Limiting Act); the maximum rates 
were set at 20% for loans of less than 100 yen, 15% between 100 to 1,000 
yen, and 12% more than 1,000 yen.
2 . 
In 1878, the National Bank Act was revised requiring the national 
banks to obey the usury law. However, the maximum rates were too high 
to be effective ceilings because national banks had relatively large
and safe borrowers and the rate of inflation was moderate following the 
Matsukata deflation. 
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According to Shibuya [1965), 65% of loans made by moneylender Sakurai 
in 1885 were at illegally high rates. There was no official regulation 
of deposit interest rates. Occasional agreements among leading banks 
with respect to maximum rates were also ineffective because of lack of
1penalties for violation. 
This free interest rate policy may not have been intentional or 
conscious, since there was no firm idea during this period of using
. 2interest rate regulations as policy instruments. However, in terms of 
the comparison of Japanese historical policy with that in LDCs today, 
the implications of this lack of interest rate regulation and of reliance 
on market mechanisms in finance are well worth exploring. 
Going hand in hand with a free, market-determined interest rate 
policy was a much more explicit policy of free entry into banking. 
While, as already noted, the number of national banks was restricted
in the 1870s to a total of 153, there were no substantial official 
res.trictions on the establishment of private banks or quasi-banks. 
The Ordinary Bank Law of 1893 also made entry very free (and easy). 
There were no minimum capital requirements and 
Ministry of Finance "guidance" to establish minimum capital levels 
were not really effective during the period under consideration here. 
Accordingly, the number of banks increased rapidly until the turn of 
1Such agreements were made in 1901 in Osaka and 1902 in Tokyo.The first agreement with a penalty rule was made in 1918 among majorbanks in Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya. 
2
In the debates on legislation, arguments in favor of the usury lawwere based on distributional equity, while opponents based their argumentson the principle of free markets. 
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the century, as previously discussed, due in part to the growth in 
demand for bank services, the desires of entrepreneurs to establish 
affiliated ("organ") banks, and the incentives offered by government 
credit as is analyzed below. 
This laissez-faire approach also characterized the Bank of Japan 
in the case of bank runs, which ocurred in 1900 and 1907. In contrast to 
its active role in the 1920s and 1930s in shoring up banks and facilitating 
mergers, the Bank of Japan did not behave as a real lender of last resort 
to individual banks during this period.1 Accordingly, banks held sub-
stantial cash in vault. 2 Indeed, the ratio of currency in vault to 
bank deposits was as high as 49% in the late 1880s, declining steadily 
thereafter to 11-12% at the turn of the century and about 9% prior to 
World War I. 3 However, as bank currency holdings declined relatively their 
deposits with other banks--the second level of reserves--rose somewhat, so 
that on average total reserves remained in excess of 20 percent. In 
addition banks held government bonds in part at least as secondary reserves. 
B. The Role of Government Credit (G) 
The manipulation over time of government credit to banks (here­
after called G) seems to have been rather intentionally pursued. G was 
composed of three main items: national bank note issue, government 
1The Bank of Japan did lend 500,000 yen to the Osaka Bankers 
Association in 1900 to help member banks. See Takizawa [1922], pp. 637-664 
for a detailed discussion of th~ 1900 panic. 
2 see Statistical Table II, columns (19), (20) and (21). The ratio 
of currency held by banks to currency in circulation rose substantially 
over the period. 
3
Statistical Table II, column (24). 
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deposits, and central bank loans. Let us explain each briefly.
1 Data on the 
composition of each component appears in Table 2; refer also to Figure 1 for 
evidence on the relative importance of G in bank funds. The time series of 
G appears in Statistical Tables 1, column 6, and II, column 7. 
(1) National tlank notes. The bank notes issue allowed by national 
banks comprised a major part of Gin the first half of Meiji. Under the 
revision of the National Bank Act in 1876 a national bank could issue its 
own bank notes up to 80% of its equity capital,
2 and ~eserve requirements 
for note issue was reduced to 20% of equity capital and could be held in 
government paper currency rather than specie. This new Act made banking 
a lucrative business; as noted earlier the number of national banks in­
creased rapidly from 4 in 1875 to 151 in 1879. Analytically, it is 
reasonable and useful to classify this right to issue currency--typically 
reserved to governments and central banks--as a form of government credit 
to the (private) national banking system. Bank note issue was in effect 
the equivalent of interest-free loans from the government to the banks 
(Patrick (1966) and (1967)). After this foundation of the national bank 
system, the government did not subsequently increase the allowable upper 
limit of bank note issue. This was partly because of the deflationary policy 
1we use the term government credit to refer to all credit from the 
monetary authorities, including the central bank. Bank holding of govern­
ment bonds in their asset portfolios is not subtracted since we assume 
this was done independently on a competitive allocative bases by the banks. 
In principle required reserves for deposits and bank note issue should be 
subtracted, but there was no Bank of Japan reserve requirement system dur­
ing this period. 
2
Moreover, 80% of equity was permitted be paid in the form of govern-
ment bonds, in fact hereditary pension bonds paid to daimyo and samurai. 
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Table 1 
Percentage Composition of Government 











































Note: Before 1887, only national banks; after 1888, all banks; during 
1888-92, G to quasi banks is assumed to be zero. All figures are based 
on annual averages. 
(a) at the end of June 
(b) amount of national bank notes in circulation. 
(c) based on figures of borrowings from the liability side of the national 
bank balance sheets, composed of loans from the government and from 
other banks including the Bank of Japan following its establishment; 
in principle loans from other commercial banks should be excluded. 
Source: Goto [1970) and annual issues of Ginko Kyoku Nenpo. (2) after 1888 
is taken from Goto [1970) table 88(1) and is the sum of lendings to the 
private sector and the special loans for national bank note redemption. 
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after 1880 and partly because of the change in policy toward the entire 
banking system which led to the establishment of the Bank of Japan. 
Following the second revision of the National Bank Act in 1883 national 
bank notes were gradually redeemed. 
(2) Government deposits. 1 Deposits by the government in banks 
were another important form of G; moreover, government deposits were 
. 2
f ree o f interest . Most of the national banks and large private banks 
were heavily dependent on these deposits, especially initially. For 
example, the share of government deposits in total deposits was 30% for 
national banks and 56% for the Yasuda Bank in 1875. The Mitsui Bank 
also relied heavily on government deposits, the share of which to total 
deposits was 43% in 1880 and still 20% in 1891. However, the government 
decreased its deposits in the hands of the private banking system as 
time went on. Initially, the government began to deposit part of its 
funds in the Cashier's Bureau of the Ministry of Finance; after 1890 
it concentrated most of its deposits into the Treasury Bureau of the 
3 
Bank of Japan. 
4 
(3) Central Bank loans. The loans of the Bank of Japan comprise 
the third form of G; it became relatively important in later periods 
(Table 1). At first, some of the loans were interest-free, and the 
1For details of government deposits see Ikeda (1964]. 
0ne of the main purposes of the foundation of the Bank of Japan was 
2Fees were even paid to the banks for services rendered in making 
transfers, etc. 
3
to serve a repository for government deposits and Treasury fiscal agent. 
4For details, see Yoshino [1954] and Goto [1970). 
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rest was lent at a relatively low interest rate; it was profitable 
. 1 
for banks simply to lend funds borrowed from the Bank of Japan. 
Consequently, the reliance of banks on Bank of Japan loans became 
substantial, especially toward the end of the century when it became a 
serious policy issue, and the monetary authorities again tried to decrease 
the dependence of banks on G. This was done by the initiation of direct 
loans by the Bank of Japan to private business in 1897. After 1899, when 
the interest rate on Bank of Japan loans to banks was raised to the same 
level as that on its direct loans to business, the dependence of banks 
on Bank of Japan loans decreased rapidly. 
The policy concerning G was remarkably consistent, at least in the 
ex post sense. The policy combined the (changing) availability of G 
with its low cost. Initially the government provided the banking system 
a large amount of funds at virtually zero interest rates; later, it 
gradually withdrew these funds while raising their cost. This policy 
had two important effects on the development of banking. The first in­
volves the initial lump sum supply of funds. Needless to say, this initial 
supply of funds made the banking business highly profitable, inducing the 
foundation of a large number of banks. 
Realistically, Gin this first role could be considered a form of 
subsidy, supplied banks in substantial amounts. For example, in 1880 the 
2total amount of G was 49 million yen, interest free. Assuming a 6% interest 
rate on deposits, this means annual implicit subsidies of 2,940 ,000 yen to 
1
This was called margin banking (sayatori ginko). 
2
LTES Vol. 7. 
- -
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the banking sector. Since the total (explicit) subsidy to industries was 
12,557,000 yen that year, it follows that implicitly the banking sector 
2received more subsidies than all other industries. Perhaps equally 
important, it should alsp be emphasized that the initial supply of 
G enhanced the prestige of the banking business and enhanced public 
confidence in these ne~_modern institutions called banks. 
The second effect of G policy involves the gradual withdrawal 
of G relative to other sources of loanable funds. Our two-fold 
hypothesis is that a) this gradual decline in G supply caused a 
rightward shift of the deposit supply function of banks and that b) 
through market forces the equilibrium quantity of deposits was increased 
as G decreased. 
The former part of our hypothesis--the substitution between G and 
deposit supply in the subjective equilibrit.nn of banks-~can be easily 
understood by the following exercise. Assume a bank maximizes its profits 
subject to its balance sheet constraint. The profit n can be written as 
where r is the rate of return on loans and other invested assets (L), and 
i is the interest rate on deposits (D). c and c2 are administrative cost1 
functions for Land D respectively. Xis a market size index on which cost 
1LTES, Vol. 7. 
2 The total effect of implicit as well as 
explicit subsidies resulting from government finance, lending, foreign 
trades and other policies c~n of course be appraised only in a general equili­
brium framework. During this period taxes were low on production activities 
relative to land (especially in agriculture) and consumption. However, trade 
restrictions--so important in the implicit subsidy structure of LDCs today-­
were insignificant in Japan during this period. 
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is dependent. The balance sheet constraint is given by 
L•D+G+E 
E represents the bank's equity capital and is assumed to be constant. 
Assuming the linear homogeneity of c1 and c2 with respect to their variables, 
we can reformulate the problem as 
maximize 
subject to 
m = g + d + e 
where 
m = L/X, g = G/X, d = D/X, e = E/X 
and 
It is reasonable to assume 
c' > 0 c" > 0 c' > 0 c" > 0
1 ' 1-' 2 ' 2 
(prime represents the derivative). The first order condition for maximization 
is given by 
r - i - c' - c' = 01 2 
By differentiating this with respect tog, we obtain 
-c" 
-l <_ad_= __.;;..l_ < 0- ag 
c" + c"1 2 
and 
1 > 
ca_.., __ c"2_ 
> 0 . - ag 
c" + c"1 2 
Thus, we can say that an increase (decrease) in g causes a decrease 
(increase) in deposit supply by banks and a less-than-proportionate 
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Figure 6 




(~ private demand 
for deposits 
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l supply of deposits by banks 
Amount of deposits 
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increase (decrease) in loans. In other words, as a bank loses government 
deposits it compensates by competing for more private deposits through higher 
interest rates. It is interesting to note that in a perfect deposit 
market (in the sense of constant marginal cost of deposits) 
am~ • -1 and - = o,ag ag 
so that, in this polar case, a change in g is completely substituted for 
by a change in deposit supply without any effect on loans. 
The latter part of our hypothesis--the substitution between G and 
private deposits in the market equilibrium for the banking system as a 
whole--is not easy to demonstrate because it requires a general equilibrium 
analysis of assets markets. 1 However, the mani point can be understood by 
reference to Figure 6. In this diagram, the larger the shift of deposit supply (the 
more perfect the deposit market), the larger will be the amount of deposits in 
equilibrium. It is important to note that the condition of a 
market-determined deposit interest rate is crucial to this analysis .
• 
If the deposit rate paid is regulated so as to be below its competitive 
equilibrium level, the equilibrium amount of deposits would be deter­
mined irrespective of the deposit supply condition. In other words, 
banks would simply supply deposits up to the amount demanded 
at the ceiling interest rates on deposits. In that situation there 
would be no substitutability between deposit supply and G, and G could 
not be manipulated to affect bank deposit supply; all G would simply 
be reflected in changes in bank loans (and other invested assets). 
1 
A rigorous general equilibrium analysis is given in Teranishi [1978). 
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An econometric test as well as a more thorough theoretical analysis 
of G policy are provided in Teranishi [1978]. Using time series data for 
1888-1913, a simultaneous equation model composed of demand for currency, 
.demand for deposits, and supply of deposits equations is estimated. In the 
supply of deposits equation, the estimation of the coefficient of g is 
-0.882, implying strong substitution for G by private deposits during 1888-
1913. Thus the government's credit policy vis a vis the banking system, 
having provided initial subsidies to encourage the establishment ofonce 
banks, can be regarded as having been quite effective subsequently in 
encouraging banks to complete in the deposit market so as to become 
financial intermediaries in the fullest sense. 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
The two previous sections provide substantial support for our 
hypotheses concerning the time at which banks first became a significant 
force in Japanese economic development and concerning the role of government 
credit in facilitating first the establishment and then the development of 
the banking system. In this section we note some qualifications to these 
rather general statements and suggest areas for further investigation. 
(1) Structural aspects 
We have treated the banking sector as a single entity without paying 
much attention to its structure. Needless to say, however, there were 
significant differences among banks depending on size and institutional 
background. 
First, the various types of banks differed substantially with respect 
to their size and liability composition. While the banking industry structure 
did evolve over this period, it can be characterized as comprising one immense 
-34-
but very ineffective bank (The Fifteenth Bank), another five very large 
banks, a considerable number of medium-sized banks, and myriads of small 
to dwarf-sized banks. Branch banking was not highly developed during 
· this period; smaller banks, typically in smaller towns and cities,·had 
correspondent relations with the larger banks and held liquid reserves in the 
forms of deposits with them. By 1897 what were later referred to as the 
"Big Five" banks--Mitsui, First (Dai-ichi), Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and 
Yasuda--had all been established. They were yet, however, to dominate the 
banking system. 
These differences were reflected also in differences among banks 
in their composition of equity, government deposits, and private deposits. 
As Statistical Table III shows, the ratio of private deposits to equity 
capital in 1890 was 0.83 for national banks (excluding the Fifteenth Bank), 
5.97 for Mitsui Bank and Yasuda Bank and 0.23 for other private banks. 
This ratio was almost certainly even lower for quasi banks. Since very small 
banks had scant deposit liabilities or government credit in the early period 
so that most of their loanable funds came from equity capital, they were 
little more than a type of moneylending company (Kato [1957]). 
Second, as already noted, the allocation of government credit (G) 
also differed among various types of banks. Government deposits were 
supplied mainly to national banks and large private banks. Only national 
banks were allowed to issue bank notes. 
The correspondence between the high deposit-equity ratio and the 
preferential allocation (and withdrawal) of Gin national banks and large private 
banks suggests an interesting problem in the transmission of government 
credit policy. The effect of G policy was probably n>re direct on national 
banks and large private banks, and was diffused to other banks through 
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market forces. This problem deserves further investigation. 
(2) Patterns of bank development 
Assume hypothetically a market for banking services, composed 
of demand for services by business firms and individual asset holders and 
supply of services by banks. The equilibrium quantity of bank services 
increases as the demand and supply functions shift over time. Ordinarily, 
the shift of the demand function is caused by changes in the parameters of 
the asset preference functions, 1 in transaction costs, and in such real 
variables as income, wealth and the rate of return on capital. The shift 
of the supply function depends on improvements in banking operations as 
well as changes in the degree of competitiveness of the banking industry, 
including competition with other financial institutions. 
The early development of Japanese banking differs from this ordinary 
pattern2 in one important respect; i.e. the role of government in shifting 
the demand and supply functions for banking services. As demonstrated 
in the previous section, Japanese government credit policy was highly 
effective in bringing about shifts in the deposit supply function 
1This is often described as the rise in the "banking habit," 
a term which refers to enhanced private sector willingness to bold deposits 
for transactions and savings purposes but which has not been precisely defined. 
A narrow definition is that the "banking habit" is a shift parameter for the 
demand for bank services function determined by increases in knowledge 
of asset holders and changes in their tastes. A broader definition would 
include parameter shifts due to changes in transactions costs in general, 
including transportation services changing access to banking facilities. 
2Tnis corresponds to the demand-following pattern in Patrick [1966). 
for banking services. And the postal savings system was initially important 
on the demand side. The number of postal offices handling postal savings 
increased to more than three thousand as early as 1886, covering most 
local towns and villages. Although quantitatively not as important as in 
the interwar period, there is no doubt that the system was qualitatively 
significant in encouraging private saving and promoting the use of saving 
accounts as a store of value. This educational role of the postal savings 
system in developing what is popularly termed the "banking habit" is an 
important area to be investigated further. 
Thus, the pattern of banking development in early modern Japan is 
1generally characterized by the leading role of government. It is important, 
however, to note a significant exception in this generalization. In Japan 
many, perhaps most, of the small private banks and quasi banks were establish-
. ed by business firms with the main purpose to finance their own business needs. 
In this case, the shift of the supply function is caused not by the spontaneous 
change in the banking sector nor by the government, but by business firms. 
This has been termed in the Japanese literature as the organ bank (kikan ginko) 
pattern. 2 It is not yet possible to assess the precise quantitative and qualita-
tive significance of this exception and further research is certainly required. 
1Tbis corresponds to the supply leading pattern in Patrick [1966], 
although the present definition is considerably narrower. 
2The term kikan ginko appeared originally in business magazines 
such as Toyokeizai Shinpo around 1900, to describe small, fragile banks 
closely related to business firms. In particular, kikan ginko was 
characterized by its high share of loans to a particular business firm with 
the shares of the.firm as collateral. Organ banks thus differ in these 
respects from the zaibatsu banks which were an integral part of family­
owned conglomerates but were large and perceived as very strong. 
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In conclusion, this paper finds that earlier analyses have tended to 
set the date in which Japanese banks became important in the economy some­
what too early; major increases in significance occurred in the mid-1890s, 
and by 1905 the banking system was well developed. At the same time 
government policy, especially its credit, was particularly important in 
what was indeed an early establishment of banks, and in their later, more 
gradual development into a true banking system based on private deposits 
as a major portion of bank liabilities. 
STATISTICAL TABLE I: 1874-1887 
---------
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) ( 7) 
National Bank Funds Private Bank Funds 
cl-Gross Capital Equity EquitybStock at Private and Private and 
GeCurrent Prices Deposits G Reserves Deposits Reserves 
(8) (9) 






















4,t.>Jo 4 9 J 
4,648 2 6 4 
4,344 2 4 3 0 ? 2 
4,0SJ 2 10 21 0 ? 2 
4,5o4 5 2.1 25 0 ? 2 
4,j61 12 39 42 1 ? 4 
4,299 11 39 45 2 8 7 
4,512 14 42 45 J ? 11 
4,4o2 lJ 43 48 5 7 18 
4,o2J 18 42 49 7 6 20 
4,bd6 14 40 49 5 6 21 
4,757 21 39 50 8 ? 20 
5,445 25 40 50 9 ? 20 









(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (161 
Yokohama Specie Bank Funds Number of Banks 
E . fqu1ty Postal 
Private and Saving National Private Quasi 



























l 2 3 1 151 38 120 
l 4 3 1 148 85 369 
l 3 3 1 143 164 438 
1 12 3 2 141 199 573 
J 17 3 5 140 213 741 
l 16 3 9 139 217 745·. 
l 11 3 15 136 219 749 










Statistical Table I (continued) 
Unit: Million yen for (1)--..(13). 
Notes: 
aFigures for national banks are at the end of June. 
b
Estimated by applying the private deposits-equity ratio of 
national banks to the capital of private banks and quasi banks. 
cThe government deposits of only Mitsui Bank and Yasuda Bank. 
The figure for Mitsui Bank is at the end of June. 
dEstimated by applying the reserves-equity ratio of national 
banks to the capital of private and quasi banks. 
eGovernment deposits and deposits from abroad. 
f Only paid-in capital. 
Sources: 
(1) Gross capital stock at 1934-36 prices (including housing) from LTES 
Vol. 3 multiplied by the price index for investment goods (including 
housing) from LTES Vol. 8. 
(2),(4) Goto [1970]table 1. Capital is paid-in capital. 
(J) Goto [1970]table 11. Includes furidashi tegata. Goto [1970] and 
annual Ginko Kyoku Nenpo. Composed of national bank notes (circulation 
outside banks), borrowings and government deposits. 
(6) Mitsui Bank and Yasuda Bank company histories. 
(7) Equity capital from Goto [1970] table 17. 
(9) Equity capital from Asakura [1961] p. 187. 
(10), (11), (12) Bank of Japan [1966]. 
(13) Asahi Shinbun [1930]. Sum of postal savings and postal transfer 
savings deposits. 
(14), (15), (16) Goto [1970] table 10, Asakura [1961) p. 187, and Nakamura [1964). 
(17) LTES, Vol. 8, Prices, Table 1, p. 134. 
Statistical Table II: 1888-1913 






















































































































































































































































































1913 18738 3499 1667 2498 428 2029 158 763 2156 
····-·· ··········· ..--------------~--~-----~~-~----··.. 
Statistical Table II (continued) 
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
Yield on Yield on 
Yield on Yield on Government Government 
Stocks Stocks Bonds Bonds 
Rate of Rate of (Excluding (Including (Excluding (Including GNE Population 
(at PostalInterest Interest Capital Capital Capital Capital 
Gains Current Savingson Bank on Time Gains Gains Gains 
& Losses) & Losses) Prices) DepositsLoans Deposits & Losses) & Losses) 
1888 11.69 4.17 15.08 11. 74 5.64 2.98 866 390 20 
1889 12.12 4.30 14.60 17.42 5.30 11.61 955 395 20 
399 201890 12.30 4.50 12.13 15.68 5.62 -0.10 1056 
1891 11.90 4.55 8.56 22.81 5.08 15.23 1139 403 20 
1892 11.24 4.30 6.89 22.24 4.81 6.12 1125 405 23 
1893 10.35 4.10 6.37 18.54 4.51 10.60 1197 409 25 
1894 11.32 4.45 6.80 23.26 4.61 2.50 1338 411 25 
....'·' 1895 11.57 4.85 6.04 11.64 4.95 -1.61 1552 416 28 
-:,- 1896 11.46 5.10 20.16 32.34 o.oo 6.81 1666 420 28 I 
1897 11.81 5.35 6.68 -26.36 5.01 2.25 1957 424 26 
1898 12.48 6.25 9.46 -16.14 5.24 0.96 2194 429 23 
1899 10.40 6.30 9.05 35.03 5.09 8.04 2314 434 23 
1900 12.15 6.80 8.78 -7.62 5.18 0.80 2414 · 438 24 
1901 13.10 7.23 13. 73 0.49 5.58 1.02 2484 444 27 
1902 12.08 7.00 11.49 35.81 5.49 7.06 2537 450 29 
1903 10.69 6.20 11.63 11.97 5.30 8.88 2696 455 32 
1904 10.73 5.98 15.00 6.66 5.56 0.88 3028 461 39 
1905 10.99 6.10 16.14 SO.JO 5.70 J.28 3084 466 53 
1906 10.29 5.90 23.00 85.99 5.35 13.12 3302 470 74 
1907 9.89 5.70 12.51 -2.65 5.51 2.39 3743 474 94 
1908 10.80 6.10 16.57 -26.42 5.76 1.20 3766 480 109 
1909 10.00 5.80 11.19 28.69 5.27 14.35 3780 486 130 
1910 8.69 5.00 7.07 34.16 4.70 12 .40 3925 492 170 
1911 8.36 4.70 13.67 -3.59 4. 77 1.04 4463 499 192 
1912 8.94 5.20 5.63 13.81 5.19 -1.86 4774 506 206 
1913 9.64 6.00 9.03 2.53 5.32 2.80 5013 513 205 
--




















































































































































































Statistical Table II (continued): 
Units: Million yen for (l)~ (9), (17) and (19) ....... (21). Percent for 
(11)--.(16). Hundred thousand for (18). Ratios for (21)~(25). 
Notes: Coverage of banks is national banks, private banks, quasi banks 
and Yokohama Specie Bank for 1888-1892. From 1893, banks are 
composed of ordinary banks, savings banks, national banks (until 
1898), Yokohama Specie Bank, Japan Hypothec Bank (from 1897), Japan 
Industrial Bank (from 1902), Hokkaido Colonial Bank (from 1898), 
prefectural agricultural banks (from 1898), and branch offices 
of foreign banks (from 1904). For (25) only ordinary banks. 
Sources: 
(1) Gross capital stock at 1934-36 prices (including housing) in LTES 
Vol. 3 multiplied by price index of investment goods (including hous­
ing) from LTES Vol. 8. 
(2) Bank of Japan [1966]. During 1888-1913, the equity capital of Japan 
National Railway is added from Asahi Shinbun (1930). Also, the bank 
equity and reserves are added during 1885-1895. In 1888, paid-in 
capital is assumed to be one-half total equity capital. During 
1888-1893, reserves are assumed to be 5% of paid-in capital. 
(3) Estimated from Kokusai Enkakuryaku Vol. 1, annual Kinyujiko Sankosho, 
and Meiji Taisho Zaiseishi (Kokusai). Composed of domestic national 
bonds, government borrowing and local government bonds; excludes 
government currency in circulation. 
(4), (5) Based on annual Ginko Kyoku Nenpo. 
(6) Based on annual Ginko Kyoku Nenpo. Private deposits during 1888-1892 
of quasi banks are estimated by applying the private deposits-capital 
ratio of private banks to the equity capital of quasi banks. 
(7) Composed of national bank notes, central bank loan to private sector 
and government deposits. For the shares see Table 1. 
(8) Based on annual Ginko Kyoku Nenpo. Reserve funds of quasi banks 
during 1888-1892 are estimated by applying the ratio of reserves to the 
capital of private banks to the equity capital of quasi banks. 
(9) For 1888-1894, the same sources as Statistical Table I. From 1895, 
Goto [1970] Table 18-1. Excludes branch offices of foreign banks and 
the Bank of Japan. 
(10) (11) Same as Figure 4. 
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Statistical Table II (continued): 
(12), (13), (14), (15) Fujino and Akiyama [1977], (12) is P (F) on1 
p. 293 (y2 , 1914-16 base), (13) P (F) on
 p. 294. (y3
, 1914-16 base),
1 
(14) P(F) on pp. 382-384 (i1 , 1934-36 base) and 
(15) P(F) on pp. 
388-389 (i2
, 1934-36 base). 
(16) LTES Vol. 1, Table 1. 
(17) Bank of Japan [1966]. 
(18) Asahi Shinbun (1930], Sum of postal savings and postal transfer 
savings deposits. 
(19) Total currency supply as the sum of (a) national bank notes, (b) 
government currency and (c) Bank of Japan notes. (a) is obtained from 
annual Ginko Kyoku Nenpo; (b) is estimated from Meiji Zaiseishi Vol. 11 
and 12 and other sources; (c) is obtained from Goto (1970], 
(20) Obtained from annual Ginko Kyoku Nenpo. (Before 1892, estimated by 
use of data after 1893.) 
(21) For ordinary banks only, computed from Asakura and Nishiyama (1973] 
pp. 107-8, adjusted by subtracting government deposits. 
(22) LTES, Vol. 8 Prices Table 1. 
::.11\'ll.::.ll.1..,i\L lJ~DLt J.J.J. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) ( 5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
lti90 
National 1891 1902 1912 
Banks 
other than Private Banks Special Ordinary Banks Special Ordinary Banks Special
the 15th b C Banks Banks Banks 
national City Local City Local City Local 
banka Banks Banks Banks Banks Banks Banks 
1 5 1831 50 5 1611 501. Number of Banks 133 2 292 
2. Paid-in Capital 
392 30d 296 45d 140 2441 548 50 319 1360and Reserves 
1098 4269 640 279 1078 20303. Total Deposits 325 179 68 54 
1257 4804. Loans 586 189 220 70 909 6067 922 266 
I 5. Share of Government 
IJ"\ 
--t Deposits in Total 
I Ueposits 0.15 0.18e o.ooe o.1i ? ? ? ? ? ? 
6. Share of Time 
Deposits in Total 
Deposits 0.24 ? ? 0.02 0.36 0.28 ? 0.49 0.41 ? 
7. Ratio of (3) to (2) 0.83 5.97 0.23 1.20 7.84 1.75 1.17g 5.58 3.38 1.49g 
(1.47) (3.48) 
8. Ratio of Borrowings 
to Total Deposits 0.33 ? ? ? 0.02 0.13 ? 0.10 o.·04 ? 
9. Ratio of Security 
Investments to 
Loans ? ? ? 1.03 0.32 0.14 0.28 0.27 0.17 0.11 
Units: (1) .- (4) million yen for 1912. For other years, 100 thousand yen. 
Notes: aThe Fifteenth Bank is excluded on account of its unique nature; bMitsui Bank and Yasuda Bank. Figures 
for Mitsui Bank are at the end of June; clncludes saving banks; dexcludes reserves; egovernment deposits of 
local banks are assumed to be zero. Total government deposits at private banks were 3,243,000 yen at the end 
of 1891, while government deposits at Mitsui bank were 3,929,000 yen at the end of June 1891; fincludes de-
posits from abroad; gfigures in parentheses include financial debentures in numerators. 
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